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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, ) REPLY TO PETITION 
) FOR REHEARING 
Plaintiff and Appellant, ) 
vs. ) Case No. 890321-CA 
GRANT S. JOHNSON, ) 
Defendant and Respondent. ) 
Pursuant to Rule 35, Rules of the Utah Court 
of Appeals and at the request of the Court, Defendant 
and Respondent Grant S. Johnson hereby replies to the 
State's Petition for Rehearing of the dismissal entered 
by the Court in its Memorandum Decision in this case 
filed October 30, 1989, and published in 120 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 40. 
DISCUSSION 
The Petition for Rehearing raises a question 
about only one aspect of this Courtfs Memorandum Decision, 
namely, whether the Motion to Reopen Preliminary Hearing 
filed January 3, 1989 (the "Motion to Reopen") extended 
the time for the State to appeal from the dismissal of 
charges against defendant. Respondent will not respond 
to the other issues in that they are not affected by 
the Petition for Rehearing. 
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I. The timeliness issue raised by the Petition 
for Rehearing appears to be well taken. 
Under the rules and statutes cited in the Petition 
for Rehearing, the Motion to Reopen was filed within 
the time allowed for filing a motion for a new trial 
under Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
Because under Rule 35 of the Rules of the Utah Court 
of Appeals
 f this Court may make a final disposition of 
the cause without reargument, defendant believes it is 
appropriate for this Court to dismiss the appeal on other 
grounds, set forth in the this Memorandum. 
II. This Court has no jurisdiction over an 
appeal of a dismissal at preliminary hearing. 
Rule 26(3) (a) of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure provides that the prosecution may appeal from 
"a final judgment of dismissal." The Circuit Court's 
Order of dismissal after the preliminary hearing in this 
case is not a final order of dismissal because it did 
not prevent refiling of the same criminal charges against 
defendant under Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. 
This case is distinguishable from State v. Gomez 
722 P.2d 747 (Utah 1986). That case held that the State 
could appeal from a trial court's dismissal of charges 
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because of its determination that two statutes proscribed 
identical conduct, so the defendants could be charged 
only under the lesser offense. The court stated "the 
trial court's determination that the charges should be 
reduced to an offense carrying a lesser penalty not charged 
in the original information prevented the State from 
proceeding on the original charges." State v. Gomez, 
supra, at 749. Because the trial court had determined 
a question of law regarding the interpretation of the 
statutes involved, the State could not have refiled the 
charges without a reversal of the decision on appeal 
because of the operation of res judicata. If the state 
had proceded to trial on the reduced charges, a trial 
on the greater charge would have been barred by double 
jeopardy. The dismissal after preliminary hearing in 
this case was the result of the Circuit Court's factual 
determination that the evidence did not establish probable 
cause. That finding would not preclude a later filing 
of the same charges against defendant, and for that reason 
the order of dismissal in this case was not a final order 
of dismissal. 
The question before this Court is not whether 
the state should have an avenue of appeal from a dismissal 
at preliminary hearing, but whether the legislature has 
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provided one. Prior to the Brickey decision there was 
no need for an avenue of appeal from a dismissal order 
of the Circuit Court. The limitations imposed upon the 
state's abilility to refile charges pursuant to Brickey 
may have created a need for such an appellate review. 
However, the legislature has not seen fit to provide 
for one. The absence of such a statutory appellate procedure 
raises no issues of constitutional dimension and it would 
be improper for this Court to supercede Rule 26 of the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and judicially create 
such a provision. 
Recognition by this Court of a right of appeal 
by the state would create equal protection problems between 
felonies filed in Circuit Court and those filed by rural 
counties in the justice courts pursuant to §78-5-104(c). 
1 
The problem is created by the absence of an 
appellate review procedure from justice court. §78-5-120 
(U.C.A. 1953 as amended) provides "any person not satisfied 
with a judgment rendered in justice court, whether rendered 
^This case was originally filed in the justice court of 
Garfield County. The defendant's motion to transfer 
to Circuit Court was granted in spite of the state's 
opposition. The transfer was granted prior to the amendment 
of 78-5-104 (c) which now authorizes preliminary hearing 
in justice court. 
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by default or after trial is entitled to a trial de novo 
in the Circuit Court." The rules of this court likewise 
do not provide for an appeal from justice court. Should 
this court accept the state's appeal from the Circuit 
Court dismissal it would seem that the court would also 
have to grant that same right of appeal to justice court 
litigants who are similarly situated. Defendant submits 
that such an expansion of appellate procedures is contrary 
to the established structure in this state. 
Until the legislature creates a statutory scheme 
which specifies what is appealable, the standards, procedures 
and time limits for such a review, the state has no right 
to appeal a dismissal by the magistrate at preliminary 
hearing. 
III. The motion to reopen was not the equivalent 
of a motion for new trial, and therefore the appeal was 
not timely, even if an appeal is authorized if timely 
filed. 
This Court's Memorandum Decision in this case 
determined that "even if liberally construed as a motion 
for a new trial, the motion to reopen was not timely 
under Rule 24 and did not toll the time in which to appeal 
from the dismissal." State v. Johnson, 120 Utah Adv. Rep. at 
41. Because it appears the Motion to Reopen was filed 
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within the time for filing a motion for a new trial, 
this Court should decide whether the Motion to Reopen 
should properly be construed as a motion for a new trial. 
The Motion to Reopen was made "pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated Section 77-35-7 and State v. Brickey, 
714 P. 2d 644 (Utah 1986)." Attached to the Motion to 
Reopen was a copy of Brickey and a proposed new information.2 
Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure (U.C.A. 
§77-35-7 (8) (c) provides that if after the preliminary 
hearing the magistrate finds no probable cause and dismisses 
the information, "the dismissal and discharge do not 
preclude the State from instituting a subsequent prosecution 
for the same offense." State v. Brickey places due process 
limitations on that right, requiring the charges be refiled 
before the magistrate who dismissed them, if possible, 
and requiring a showing of new or previously unavailable 
evidence or other good cause. The magistrate is then 
to examine the new evidence to determine if it is "sufficient 
to require a re-examination and possible reversal of 
the earlier decision dismissing the charges." Brickey 
at 647. The purpose of the Brickey constraints is to 
prevent harrassment of defendants by 
^Motion to Reopen Preliminary Hearing, Exhibit "B" to 
the Docketing Statedment filed in this case. 
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repeated filings of the same charges. 
A Brickey motion can be made at any time before 
the statute of limitations runs on the charged offense. 
The fact it is made within ten days of the decision dismissing 
charges is irrelevant. A Brickey motion is fundamentally 
and functionally different from a motion for new trial. 
A Brickey motion does not challenge or assert error in 
the magistrate's order of dismissal. It asks the magistrate 
to consider new or previously unavailable evidence not 
presented at the preliminary hearing. It argues that 
new evidence should provide a basis for a different result 
at a new or supplementary preliminary hearing. That 
is exactly the substance and intention of the Motion 
to Reopen filed in this case. 
The Motion to Reopen did not cite, refer to, 
or rely on Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
regarding motions for new trial. That rule provides 
in relevant part that the Court may "grant a new trial 
in the interest of justice if there is any error or impro-
priety which had a substantial adverse effect upon the 
rights of a party," and requires that a Motion for new 
trial be filed within ten days after imposition of sentence. 
The Motion to Reopen alleged no error or impropriety. 
Courts of other states have recognized that 
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an appeal from an order of dismissal and an attempt to 
refile charges based on new evidence after dismissal 
of those charges are distinct and unrelated procedures. 
The decision in Brickey relied on and adopted the reasoning 
of the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Jones v. State, 481 
P.2d 169 (Okl. Cr. 1971). After that decision, the Oklahoma 
Court adopted a rule allowing an appeal from a dismissal 
at preliminary hearing and instituting specific procedures 
to take such an appeal. In Morgan v. State, 675 P.2d 
473 (Okl. Cr. 1984), the Oklahoma appeals court determined 
that those rules had not been followed and that an appeal 
could not be taken from the order of dismissal, but noted 
that though an appeal was prohibited, the decision was 
"without prejudice to the refiling of the charge under 
Jones v. State. . . . Refiling under Jones and appeal 
... are alternative modes of procedure for the State." 
Id., at 476. 
The State of Kansas allows both an appeal from 
an order of dismissal at preliminary hearing and the 
refiling of the Complaint if additional witnesses or 
new evidence are discovered. In State v. Zimmerman, 
660 P. 2d 960 (Kan. 1983), the defendant contended that 
the state could not appeal from an order of dismissal 
without making an attempt to refile the charges. The 
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Kansas Supreme Court stated "the possibility that the 
state may choose not to appeal the District Court's order 
and instead refile the complaint should additional witnesses 
or new evidence be procured does not alter the right 
to appeal clearly authorized by the statute." Id., at 
963. 
The stay of the time periods for appellate 
review while a motion for a new trial is heard makes 
sense in that it allows the lower court to consider the 
motions prior to the appellate review, and it avoids 
requiring the parties to be in two forums simultaneously. 
Those dual purposes are not served when it is a Brickey 
motion that is filed in the lower court. As previously 
discussed, an appeal from the magistrate's dismissal 
involves a claim of a legal error committed by the judge 
during the proceedings. Conversely, a Brickey motion 
deals the sufficiency and weight of the evidence produced 
subsequent to that hearing. Accordingly, the lower court 
is never asked to consider the issues which form the 
basis of the appeal and there is nothing to be gained 
by a stay of the appellate procedings. 
Additionally, the Brickey motion can be filed 
at any time. The policy of avoiding two forums litigating 
the same case disappears within the practicalities of 
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the situation. The likely time for the discovery of 
new or previously unavailable evidence is well beyond 
the ten days following the preliminary hearing. It is 
most likely to be discovered during the pendency of the 
appeal. If the state has a right to appeal the dismissal, 
it is unavoidable as a practical matter that the parties 
will be in two forums at the same time. 
In that there is no statutory authorization 
for treating a Brickey motion as a motion for a new trial, 
it should only be done if it serves the same purposes 
as that motion. Defendant submits that it does not and 
its filing should not toll the time allowed for the filing 
of an appeal. This Court should rule that making a Brickey 
Motion, even if within ten days of a dismissal after 
preliminary hearing, does not extend the time to appeal 
the dismissal. The right to appeal a dismissal and to 
seek to refile charges are distinct and separate remedies. 
IV. Even if the Notice of Appeal was timely, 
the appeal should be dismissed because the dismissal 
was not clearly erroneous or an abuse of discretion. 
Counsel for defendant have been unable to locate 
any Utah cases in which there has been an appeal from 
a dismissal at preliminary hearing, so there is no case 
law on the standard of review of such a dismissal. In 
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Idaho, the trial court's decision on probable cause will 
be overturned only on a showing that the magistrate abused 
his discretion. State v. Owens, 101 Idaho 632, 619 P. 2d 
787 (1979). The facts found by a judge in a criminal 
case and its verdict based on those facts are reviewed 
under the clearly erroneous standard of review, and an 
appeals court will not overturn such findings unless 
they are against the clear weight of the evidence or 
unless the appellate court reaches the firm and definite 
conviction that a mistake has been made. State v. Walkerf 
743 P.2d 191 (Utah 1987). Under either standard, it 
is appropriate for this Court to affirm the order of 
dismissal because the grounds for review are so insubstantial 
as not to merit further consideration by this Court. 
As shown by the issues stated in the Docketing 
Statement filed by the State in this case, there is no 
exception taken to any of the Findings of Fact made by 
the Circuit Court. Those findings, attached as Exhibit 
"A" to the Docketing Statement, included findings that 
none of the shoes or boots seized from defendant's trailer 
matched the footprints which had been followed, that 
the Deer Creek Ranch contains more than one dwelling 
unit or site, and that the state's criminalist concluded 
that the plaster casts of shoe impressions taken from 
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the trail of footprints leading away from the damaged 
bulldozers were different than the shoes and boots actually 
seized by the officers from the defendant's trailer. 
(Findings 41, 2, 12, 13, 50) . In the Circuit Court's 
Order on Motion to Reopen Preliminary Hearing, attached 
as Exhibit WCM to the Docketing Statement, the Circuit 
Court stated: "One of the chief reasons for the earlier 
dismissal of charges revolved around footprints. Specifi-
cally, the Court felt that the State had failed to show 
a connection between the defendant and the footprints 
found at the crime scene." 
Based on the undisputed Findings of Fact of 
the Circuit Court, there is clearly evidence to support 
its finding of no probable cause for a bindover. This 
Court should not substitute its judgment on that factual 
issue for that of the Circuit Court. Whether the standard 
of review is an abuse of discretion or a clearly erroneous 
standard, there is no basis for overturning the decision 
of the Circuit Court that no probable cause existed. 
CONCLUSION 
For all of the foregoing reasons, defendant 
respectfully requests that the Court's earlier decision 
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of dismissal of the State's appeal be affirmed. 
DATED this 2*V day of November, 1989. 
RICHARDS, BIRD & KUMP 
David J\ Bird 
Attorney for Defendant 
& Respondent 
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